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THE DRUG MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO WARN-TO
WHOM DOES IT EXTEND?
DONALD E. THOMPSON II
I. INTRODUCTION
A is the manufacturer of a prescription drug D, which has
proven effective in the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis. The
drug has certain known risks which appear in a small percentage
of the consumers who take the drug. One of these risks is chloro-
quine retinopathy-a degeneration of certain cells in the retina of
the eye which results in irreversible blindness. As a method of
warning about this risk, A places an advertisement in the Physi-
cian's Desk Reference and, as is required by federal law, encloses
a "package insert" with each shipment of the drug to pharma-
cists. The insert is "theoretically available" to a prescribing phy-
sician upon request. But as is customary and permitted by federal
law, the pharmacist removes and discards the package insert
before dispensing the drug to consumers. B, a physician, diagno-
ses rheumatoid arthritis in his patient, P. B chooses the drug D
from the array of available treatments and prescribes it for P's
condition. P takes the drug over a period of several years and goes
blind. P never received a warning about the risk of blindness at-
tending the use of D. Assuming that P would have chosen another
form of treatment had she known about the risk, who, if anyone,
should be liable for the failure to warn and the consequent
injury?1
Pharmaceutical drugs present a vast array of legal, moral, and
ethical considerations in their development, distribution, and ap-
plication. As part of the larger category of "unavoidably unsafe"
products, pharmaceutical drugs and especially prescription drugs
are prime examples of the conflict between products which, given
the present state of human skills and knowledge, cannot be made
entirely safe, but which nonetheless have substantial beneficial
qualities. An important question raised by every such product is
whether it should be marketed at all. This is generally a matter of
balancing the probability and gravity of the risk of harm against
the social utility of the product. For pharmaceutical drugs in this
country, the balance is struck in favor of the utility of the drug
1. This hypothetical involves the actual indications of the drug "Aralen" manufactured
by Sterling Drug, Inc. The cases involving Sterling Drug at infra notes 12, 13, and 15 con-
cern litigation regarding this drug.
136 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:135
when it obtains approval by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).2 This article presumes that such a balance was correctly
struck.
A correct decision to market a prescription drug does not resolve
the question of risk allocation. The judicial response to this ques-
tion regarding other products with known, latent risks has been to
impose upon the manufacturer a duty to warn foreseeable users of
the product of such risks. This view is consistent with section 388
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which imposes liability on
suppliers of products known to be dangerous for their intended
use:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or
to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by
the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel
is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dan-
gerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.3
Pharmaceutical drugs fulfill the prerequisites of subsections
388(a) and (b). Thus, one would expect that a "duty to inform" the
patient would arise on the part of the drug manufacturer. Indeed,
this is the position which is followed for nonprescription, "over-
the-counter" drugs. 4 The courts, however, have created an excep-
2. For provisions relating to the approval of new drugs, see 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1982).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 388 (1965).
4. See, e.g., Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1979) (failure to warn of risk of gastrointestinal hemorrhaging where plaintiff took eight
"Anacin" tablets daily for 14 months for relief of arthritis pain); Michael v. Warner/Chil-
cott, 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (question as to adequacy of warning regarding the
risk of kidney failure from the prolonged use of "Sinutab" and its grocery store brand
equivalent).
For an interesting extension of the "over-the-counter" rationale to certain immunizations,
see Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (polio vaccine was administered in
a manner more like that of a county health clinic than by prescription after consultation
with a physician); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (while
polio vaccine was a prescription drug, it was not dispensed as such; rather, "lilt was dis-
pensed to all comers at mass clinics without an individualized balancing by a physician of
DRUG MANUFACTURER'S DUTY
tion to the duty to warn for the manufacturers of prescription
drugs. The prescription drug manufacturer's duty to warn does not
extend to the foreseeable user of the product (the patient), but
rather to the medical community (generally the prescribing physi-
cian) which acts as "learned intermediary." As one court put it,
"the duty to warn the patient, if one exists, lies with the physician
and not with the drug manufacturer."" It is the thesis of this Com-
ment that the time has come to reevaluate and abandon this judi-
cially-created exception as contrary to both contemporary social
policy and the practical realities of the medical profession.6
II. DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT SCOPE OF THE DRUG
MANUFACTURER'S DUTY TO WARN
Until recently, the law was harsh to an injured patient who
brought suit against a manufacturer of prescription drugs for fail-
ure to provide a warning either to himself or his prescribing physi-
cian. Not only did the courts deny that there was a duty to warn
the patient, they frequently imposed only the most rudimentary
duty to warn the prescribing physician. Marcus v. Specific
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is an example of this extreme position. Mar-
cus involved the death of a thirteen-month-old child from an over-
dose of suppositories administered at the prescription of a physi-
cian.7 The defendant, Specific Pharmaceuticals, manufactured the
suppositories in two sizes, one for children, one for adults." The
only information provided by the manufacturer about the product
was by advertisements in medical journals. In these advertise-
the risks involved"). Id at 131. See also Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1440 (8th Cir.
1984). Cf. Schindler v. Lederle Laboratories, 725 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983) (when polio vac-
cine is dispensed as prescription drug by a private physician, manufacturer's duty to warn is
to physician, as with other prescription drugs).
5. Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977).
6. In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985), the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts abandoned the "learned intermediary" theory with
regard to the prescription of oral contraceptives:
Oral contraceptives, however, bear peculiar characteristics which warrant imposi-
tion of a common law duty on the manufacturer to warn users directly of associ-
ated risks. Whereas a patient's involvement in decision-making concerning use of
a prescription drug necessary to treat a malady is typically minimal or nonexis-
tent, the healthy, young consumer of oral contraceptives is usually actively in-
volved in the decision to use "the pill," as opposed to other available birth control
products, and the prescribing physician is relegated to a relatively passive role.
Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
7. 77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.'1948). The facts presented are plaintiff's allega-
tions and not factual findings of the court. Id.
8. Id.
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ments, information concerning dosage was either omitted or given
with insufficient emphasis or clarity.9 Furthermore, no warning was
given regarding overdosage. After first finding no duty to warn the
patient, the court completely discredited the claim of "negligent
failure to give adequate information."'" The court, seeming content
that the manufacturer had not engaged in misrepresentation, rea-
soned that "[t]here is no reason to believe that a physician would
care to disregard his own knowledge of the effects of drugs and
hence of the quantity to be administered, and substitute for his
own judgment that of a drug manufacturer."' Unfortunately, the
court failed to consider that without adequate guidance from the
drug manufacturer, the only method for the physician to obtain
"knowledge of the effects" of the drug is to experiment on his pa-
tients-a procedure which proved fatal in the instant case.
Under the modern rule, which emerged in the late 1960s, the
manufacturer of prescription drugs has the duty to make timely
and adequate warnings to the medical profession of any dangerous
side effects produced by the drug which it knows of or should know
of," and is directly liable to the patient for a breach of that duty."
Similarly, courts have expanded the scope of the duty to warn to
require disclosure of adverse effects "even though the adverse ef-
fect[s] involve only a statistically small percentage of those upon
whom [the drug is] used." 14 Moreover, decisions have made it clear
that the manufacturer's duty to warn is to the medical community
as a whole, and not to a particular prescribing physician with
which the drug company has had formal contact.15 These decisions
can be commended for their practical realizations that the patient
may not return to the original prescribing physician when
problems with the treatment occur.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 509-10.
12. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85, (8th Cir. 1966); McElhaney
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. Supp. 228, 231 (D.S.D. 1983); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1050 (Kan.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 365 (1984); Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1981); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836
(Ohio 1984); Barson v. E.&. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984).
13. See, e.g., Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970) (direct ac-
tion against manufacturer predicated upon theory of vicarious liability); Wooderson, 681
P.2d at 1050; McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974).
14. Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1400 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966)).
15. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142-43 (3d Cir. 1973); Mahr v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1230 (M1. App. Ct. 1979).
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Courts have recognized that even where an adequate warning is
originally given by the drug manufacturer, this adequate warning
may nonetheless be nullified by subsequent advertising and pro-
motional activities which downplay the risks of the drug or which
encourage its application to ailments for which the drug is ill-
suited. Love v. Wolf" is the leading case for this proposition. Love
involved the drug chloromycetin, manufactured by Parke-Davis.17
The drug was effective in the treatment of certain infections. Due
to its association with certain serious risks, such as various blood
disorders,18 administration was indicated only for the treatment of
serious diseases, such as typhoid and Rocky Mountain spotted fe-
ver.19 Mrs. Love took the drug initially for the treatment of a sore
gum, and later for the treatment of bronchitis. 0 She subsequently
developed aplastic anemia, a condition characterized by destruc-
tion of the blood-forming elements in the bone marrow.2" Though
Parke-Davis adequately warned of the drug's risks in its medical
advertisements, it engaged in a number of activities which consid-
erably diminished the perceived dangers of the drug.22 The com-
pany made statements extolling the "very minimal untoward side
effects" of the drug in its advertising. 23 Likewise, the company
president made representations to the "detail men" selling the
product2 ' that "Chloromycetin has been officially cleared by the
FDA and the National Research Council with no restrictions on
the number or range of diseases for which Chloromycetin may be
administered"25 and that there was " 'no valid scientific proof' that
aplas[tic] [anemia] resulted from chloromycetin." 26 The court con-
cluded that Parke-Davis' overpromotion may well have induced
the doctor to disregard the warnings previously given.27
16. 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
17. Id. at 184.
18. Id. at 184-85.
19. Id. at 194.
20. Id. at 186.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 195.
23. Id.
24. Detail men act as salesmen for the pharmaceutical manufacturer. For a description
of the role of detail men in the ethical pharmaceutical industry, see Comment, The Ubiqui-
tous Detailman: An Inquiry Into His Functions and Activities and the Laws Relating to
Them, 1 HoFmsTA L.Rnv. 183 (1973).
25. Love, 38 Cal. Rptr at 195. The detail men were instructed to relay this information
to the physicians they visited. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 196. The court reversed and remanded the verdict against Parke-Davis on
other grounds. Id. at 197.
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While the courts have shown marked improvement in their in-
terpretation of the duty to warn the medical community, no corre-
sponding advancement has been made regarding a duty of the drug
manufacturer to warn the consumer.28 Rather, the courts have
steadfastly adhered to the view that where a duty to warn the con-
sumer exists, it is the duty of the prescribing physician and not the
drug manufacturer. 29 The rationale for this "no duty" rule was elo-
quently stated by the court in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories:
This special standard for prescription drugs is an understandable
exception to the Restatement's general rule that one who markets
goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in
his products. Prescription drugs are likely to be complex
medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical
expert, the prescribing physician can take into account the
propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his pa-
tient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication
against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed
one, an individualized medical judgment bottomed on a knowl-
edge of both patient and palliative. Pharmaceutical companies
then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in
patent drugs sold over the counter, in selling prescription drugs
are required to warn only the prescribing physician, who acts as a
"learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and
consumer.
30
In Buckner v. Allergan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,31 Florida's Fifth
District Court of Appeal recently broadened this rule such that
even if the manufacturer is aware that the medical community is
not warning the patient of known harmful risks attending the use
of a drug, the manufacturer still has no duty to warn the patient.32
The plaintiff in Buckner was prescribed corticosteroids for an eye
28. For recent cases finding no duty of the manufacturer to warn the patient, see, e.g.,
Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 447 So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1984); Singleton v.
Airco, Inc., 314 S.E.2d 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Kinney v. Hutchinson, 449 So. 2d 696 (La.
Ct. App. 1984); Serna v. Roche Laboratories, 684 P.2d 1187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Ross v.
Jacobs, 684 P.2d 1211 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
29. For cases discussing a duty of the physician to warn the patient regarding drugs he is
prescribing, see Koury v. Follo, 158 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. 1968); Sharpe v. Pugh, 155 S.E.2d 108
(N.C. 1967).
30. 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.) (citation omitted) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974).
31. 400 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th DCA), petition for review denied, 407 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.
1981).
32. Id. at 823-24.
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disorder. She subsequently developed one of the known side effects
of the drug-aseptic necrosis of her femoral heads3 (cell death
within part of the femur bone in the thigh). She was not warned of
this risk.34 In dismissing the claim against the manufacturer, the
court reasoned that "[s]ince physicians do not have an absolute
duty to inform patients of all possible side effects in every in-
stance, failure to do so in a particular instance should not give rise
to a duty in the manufacturer."35
An issue not addressed in Buckner was whether, in light of the
allegation of known disregard of the warnings by the medical pro-
fession, the manufacturer's warnings to the medical profession
were adequate. The court in Incollingo v. Ewing3 6 noted that
"[w]hen a required warning is retained unchanged in the face of
being widely disregarded, and the supplier knows or has reason to
know of such wide disregard, a jury may be permitted to find the
warning insufficient. 3 7 Thus, the disregard of the manufacturer's
warnings in Buckner could have been used to demonstrate the
need for more explicit and prominent warnings from the
manufacturer.
In a limited number of instances, the FDA has mandated that
certain warnings be provided directly to the patient by the manu-
facturer 38 The issue arising in such instances is whether a private
cause of action by the patient is created when such warnings are
not given, in violation of FDA regulations. In responding to this
issue, the court in Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp."9
held that a duty to warn the patient was created. The plaintiff in
Lukaszewicz suffered a cerebrovascular accident as a result of tak-
ing oral contraceptives produced by the defendant. 40 The FDA had
required by regulation that "[i]nformation in lay language concern-
ing effectiveness, contraindication, warnings, precautions, and ad-
33. Id. at 821.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 824.
36. 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971).
37. Id. at 222; see also Salmon v. Parke, Davis and Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1362 (4th Cir.
1975).
38. There are currently seven prescription drugs for which the FDA requires patient
labeling or patient package inserts. All cited sections are to 21 C.F.RL (1984): (1) isoprotere-
nol inhalation drug, § 201.305; (2) oral contraceptives, § 310.501(a); (3) oral postcoital con-
traceptive ("mnorning-after" pill), § 310.501(b); (4) medroxyprogesterone acetate injectable
contraceptive (Depro-Provera), § 310.501a; (5) intrauterine devices, § 310.502; (6) estrogenic
drugs, § 310.515; and (7) progestational drugs, § 310.516.
39. 510 F. Supp 961 (E.D. Wis.), modified, 532 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
40. Id. at 962.
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verse reactions shall be furnished to each patient receiving oral
contraceptives." '41 The plaintiff received no such information. Ap-
plying Wisconsin law as to when a standard of conduct defined by
regulation will be adopted,42 the court determined that:
"[s]ince [the regulation] was enacted to protect persons like the
plaintiff.. ., and since Wisconsin holds that violation of such a
regulation by one on whom it imposes a duty resulting in occur-
rence of the harm which the regulation was designed to prevent
constitutes negligence per se, the defendant in this case did have
a duty to warn the plaintiff ... of the possible side effects of [the
oral contraceptive].' 3
In recent years, the FDA has promulgated rules to require direct
manufacturer-to-patient warnings for certain prescription drugs.44
The rules, however, were revoked prior to their effective date. The
revocation was due in part to representations made by the phar-
maceutical industry and medical profession of a commitment to
implement their own system of conveying warnings to consumers. 45
This creates an issue as to how such "voluntary" warnings should
be treated. Should they be deemed to create a comprehensive duty
to warn the patient similar to the current duty of the manufacturer
to the medical community? Or should such warnings only be re-
quired to be accurate, though not necessarily complete? This issue
was addressed by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Seley v. G.D.
Searle & Co. 48 Seley involved the prescription of the oral contra-
ceptive "Ovulen.' 47 In addition to preparing warnings for dis-
seminaton to the medical community, the defendant, Searle, also
41. Id. at 963 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a)).
42. See generally, RESTATEmENr (SEcoND) OP TORTS § 286 (1963), cited in Lukaszewicz,
510 F. Supp. at 964.
43. Lukaszewicz, 510 F. Supp. at 965.
44. See Prescription Drug Products; Patient Labeling Requirements, 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016
(1979) (proposed July 6, 1979); Prescription Drug Products; Patient Package Inserts Re-
quirements, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754 (1980) (adopted Sept. 12, 1980); Prescription Drug Prod-
ucts That Require Patient Package Inserts; Temporary Stay of Effective Dates, 46 Fed. Reg.
23,739 (1981) (temporary stay of effective date of final rule, Apr. 28, 1981); Prescription
Drug Products; Revocation of Patient Package Insert Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147
(1982) (revoking the rule, Sept. 7, 1982). Prior to the FDA's 1979 proposal, legislation was
introduced in both houses of Congress to require patient labeling for presciption drugs.
Neither bill, however, was adopted. See S. 2755, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 151(b) (1978); H.R.
8891, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1977).
45. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (1982). For specific examples of such private initiatives, see 47
Fed. Reg. at 39,150-51 comment 6 (1982).
46. 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981).
47. Id. at 834.
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prepared pamphlets containing warnings and use instructions writ-
ten in lay language for the ultimate users of the pill."8 The su-
preme court stated that the court of appeals had employed the
"voluntary duty doctrine, ' ' 4 and had held that "having voluntarily
undertaken to provide such warnings, Searle could be held liable if
the warnings failed to convey a full explanation of the risks associ-
ated with use of Ovulen, and if Mrs. Seley relied on those warn-
ings."' 0 In a five-two decision, the supreme court reversed, holding
the voluntary duty doctrine inapplicable to prescription drugs.5 1
The court reasoned that although the pamphlet was intended to
benefit the patient, the patient was expected to place primary reli-
ance on the advice of her prescribing physician and not upon the
literature provided by the manufacturer.52 The manufacturer's
duty to warn was satisfied when the physician was warned. The
physician was to act as a "learned intermediary" between the drug
manufacturer and patient. 3 Thus, even where the manufacturer
voluntarily undertakes to provide the patient with information, the
learned intermediary theory is a hurdle, if not a bar, to the imposi-
tion of a direct manufacturer-to-patient duty to warn.
While the Reyes theory seems plausible, a closer examination
reveals deficiencies. The doctrine substantially overstates the abil-
ity and willingness of the medical community to act as a "learned
intermediary," impedes the right of the patient to knowledge of
the substances which he places in his body, and ignores the sub-
stantial benefits derived from having an informed patient.
48. Id. at 839. At the time in question, the FDA did not require manufacturers of oral
contraceptives to provide warnings directly to the consumer. Id. n.6.
49. Under the voluntary duty doctrine, one who gratuitously undertakes a voluntary act
assumes the duty to complete it with the exercise of due care under the circumstances. See
W. PRossBER HANDBOOK OF T= LAW OF ToRn § 56, at 343-48 (4th ed. 1971); RESATEMNr
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965), cited in Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 839.
50. Seley, 423 N.E.2d at 839 (citing No. 80-336, Ohio Ct. App.) (footnote omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 839-40.
53. Justice Brown, joined by Justice Donofrio, adopted the position of the court of ap-
peals. He noted the possible economic benefit to Searle from the pamphlet as a form of
promotional advertising. Similarly, he felt that while "Searle may well have had no duty to
warn prospective users by direct communication, but having undertaken to do so volunta-
rily, Searle must inform prospective users fully in its promotional literature." Id. at 845
(Brown, J., dissenting).
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III. WHY SHOULD THERE BE A DIRECT MANUFACTURER-TO-
PATIENT WARNING?
A. Shortcomings in the Marketing System
Before proceeding to the specific problems with the current
warning and advertising system of manufacturers, it is first neces-
sary to have a basic understanding of how that system works. Once
the decision is made to warn of certain adverse effects, the drug
manufacturer has a number of avenues available to warn the phy-
sician. The manufacturer may warn through the package insert,
which is a legally required compendium included with each origi-
nal drug package sent to a pharmacy by the manufacturer;5 by
advertisement in the Physician's Desk Reference; by advertise-
ments in medical publications; by direct letters to physicians; or by
personal contact with medical personnel in their offices or at con-
ventions, through company representatives known as "detail
men."'6
Because the patient package insert is not distributed to the phy-
sician but to the dispensing agent " and because the Physician's
Desk Reference is published only once a year, the last three adver-
tising methods have the greatest potential for providing up-to-date
warnings regarding the risks of the manufacturer's products. Yet
these three methods have historically proved to be the most
abused and least reliable.57
Until recently, there was little regulation regarding the advertis-
ing claims of drug manufacturers. Unproven claims of effectiveness
and superiority were the rule, rather than the exception. 8 Not un-
til the FDA propounded regulations in the 1960s was some sem-
blance of order imposed.'9 These new regulations required a fair
balance in all forms of advertising. Fair balance essentially means
that the physician be properly warned about the dangers and side
effects of a drug in equal balance to the assertion of the drug's
benefits. Likewise, documentation of claims of superiority and ef-
fectiveness were required.60
While the new regulations have had the effect of making adver-
54. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c) (1984).
55. See 1 M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LAsuvrry § 3.05, at 3-16 (1974).
56. 1 M. DIXON, supra note 55, § 6.1014][a], at 6-33 (1975).
57. See, e.g., supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text; infra notes 63-66 and accompa-
nying text (discussing overpromotion through such advertising methods).
58. See 1 M. DIXON, supra note 55, § 6.1011], at 6-23.
59. For current FDA regulation in this area, see 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1984).
60. For current FDA regulation, see 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(6) (1984).
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tisements more reliable, they have not stemmed the great volume
of drug literature and advertising that is sent to or directed at phy-
sicians. Many have conceded that in light of the constant bom-
bardment with large volumes of rapidly changing drug literature,
the physician is "unable to keep up with this ever-changing sea of
knowledge." 6' This fact undercuts the theory of the physician as a
"learned intermediary" between the drug manufacturer and the
patient. The sheer volume of drug literature militates against the
physician's being informed of all the hazards of a particular
drug-especially those hazards which are discovered after the ini-
tial marketing of a drug and about which supplemental warnings
have been distributed. Direct warnings accompanying prescriptions
to patients would not result in similar inundation, as the patient is
not concerned with knowing the risks of a broad spectrum of
drugs, but only of the risks of the drug prescribed.
On occasion, the opposite result occurs. A physician who learns
the proper warnings regarding a particular drug gets so caught up
in the manufacturer's promotional advertising that he "forgets" or
is led to disregard the warnings. This phenomenon is generally re-
ferred to as "overpromotion. ' '62 Salmon v. Parke, Davis and Co.6s
involved a prescribing physician who received a calendar advertis-
ing chloromycetin, together with a sample package containing a
warning about the drug." In recognizing that "a calendar might
remain on a physician's desk as a constant reminder to prescribe a
drug long after the sample and its warning had been removed,"'6 5
the court concluded that "[a] jury could infer. . . that the absence
of a warning on an advertisement [the calendar]. . . was a form of
overpromotion which nullified the effect of even a valid warning on
the package."6 6
The problem of overpromotion would be unlikely to affect direct
warnings to the patient, since prescription drug manufacturers
rarely advertise their products to the general public. In summary,
many of the difficulties in providing adequate warnings under the
current "duty to warn the medical community" standard would
not be present in a direct manufacturer-to-patient warning system.
61. See 1 M. DixoN, supra note 55, § 6.10[1], at 6-25; Annot., 94 A.L.PR3d 1080, 1081
(1979); Comment, supra note 24, at 210-211 (quoting a "distinguished" physician).
62. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
63. 520 F.2d 1359 (4th Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 1363.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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B. Informed Consent-The Patient's Right to be Free of
Impediments to Self-Determination
Undoubtedly, the single most important reason for imposing
upon the manufacturer of prescription drugs the duty to warn con-
sumers of possible side effects is the notion of informed consent. 7
Historically, the problem of informed consent arose in two situa-
tions involving medical operations and treatments. The first situa-
tion occurred where the physician exceeded the scope of the pa-
tient's consent, as where the physician operated on the wrong ear
or otherwise operated on parts of the body to which the patient
had not consented. The second situation involved a failure to dis-
close a particular risk. This situation frequently arises today and
involves the physician's duty to advise the patient of the risks in-
herent in a particular course of treatment and the alternatives
available to the patient in lieu of undergoing the suggested
treatment.68
The second situation, involving the failure to disclose risks, and
which heretofore had been limited to disclosure among methods of
treatment,6 now presents a problem in physicians' prescriptions.
By placing the warning into the hands of the physician, who is
given sole discretion to determine what risk, if any, will be commu-
nicated to the patient, the current system of manufacturer warn-
ings perpetuates paternalism and aggravates the problem of in-
formed consent.
The concept of informed consent is inextricably bound with the
ideas of active participation in the treatment process and self-de-
termination. It is the belief that it is the ultimate prerogative of
the patient to determine where his interests lie-that it is the right
of every human being, and thus every patient of adult years and
sound mind, to determine what shall be done with his own body.
Before such self-determination can be intelligently exercised, how-
ever, the patient must have a familiarity with the availability and
risks of alternative methods of treatment."0
67. For a thorough discussion of the issues raised by the concept of informed consent,
see Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know, 40 INs. Corms. J. 580 (1973); Plante, An
Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FoRHAam L. Rzv. 639 (1968); Waltz & Scheuneman, In-
formed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. Rav. 628 (1970); Comment, Informed Consent in
Medical Malpractice, 55 CALip. L. REv. 1396 (1967).
68. See W. PRossEs & W. KzZrN. Tim LAw OF TORTS § 32, at 189-92 (5th ed. 1984).
69. A cancer patient, for example, may wish to choose an operation over radiation
therapy.
70. Numerous studies have concluded that health care professionals, including both phy-
DRUG MANUFACTURER'S DUTY
The extent to which the patient is entitled to knowledge of the
risks attending a particular course of treatment and the availabil-
ity of alternative treatment has been a stumbling block for the
courts. In general, the judicial attitude is that "reasonable disclos-
ure" is required of the physician. Just what "reasonable disclos-
ure" means, however, varies widely.
One view, which is consistent with the idea of self-determina-
tion, is represented in Canterbury v. Spence."1 Canterbury in-
volved a young man troubled only by back pain, who submitted to
an exploratory and remedial operation on his back. 2 He was not
informed of the incidental risk of paralysis.73 Following the opera-
tion, he became partially paralyzed. In reversing a directed ver-
dict for the physician, the court of appeals held that the evidence
presented a jury question as to the sufficiency of the surgeon's dis-
closure regarding whether a one percent possibility of paralysis was
peril of sufficient magnitude to require disclosure.7 5 The court also
found that the duty to inform was independent of a patient's re-
quest for disclosure and that the standard for disclosure is not that
which is set by custom of physicians practicing in the community.
Rather, the court reasoned that "[r]espect for the patient's right of
self-determination on particular therapy demands a standard set
by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may
not impose upon themselves.17 6
sicians and pharmacists, do not provide information to patients about prescription drug
products. See, e.g., Ley & Morris, Psychological Aspects of Written Information for Pa-
tients, in CONTaunTONS To MEDICAcL PsYcHoLoGY 117, 122 Table 3, Frequency with which
Health Professionals Fail to Provide Appropriate Information (3d ed. 1984) (ten studies
reported findings ranging from 49% to 100% regarding the percentage of occasions on
which professionals did not provide information). See also Hoff, How Often Do Consumers
Seek Your Advice on Rx and OTC Products?, 163 PHARMACY TuMs 52 (1975) (48% of sur-
vey respondents said their physician did not talk to them about their most recent prescrip-
tion, and 88% said their pharmacist did not talk to them about the prescription), discussed
in 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,020 (1979).
71. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
72. Id. at 776.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 794. Cf. Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (1 in 3,000,000 chance
of vaccine-induced polio; disclosure required); Bowers v. Talmage, 159 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1963) (3% chance of death, paralysis or other injury-, disclosure required); Yeates v.
Harms, 393 P.2d 982 (Kan. 1964) (1.5% chance of loss of eye; disclosure not required), mod-
ified, 401 P.2d 659 (1965).
76. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784 (footnotes omitted). For cases consistent with this view,
see Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Scott
v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1972).
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In contrast to this rather broad view of what constitutes "rea-
sonable disclosure" is the view demonstrated by Buckner v. Aller-
gan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," in which the court stated that "[t]he
physician decides what facts should be told to the patient ...
[based upon his perception of what is] in the best interest of the
patient. '78 The court noted that the appropriate standard of re-
view was "whether a reasonable medical practitioner in the com-
munity would make the pertinent disclosures under the same or
similar circumstance. ' 79 In other words, the duty to disclose is set
by physicians' customary practice.80 Obviously, this paternalistic
view of the physician is in opposition to the idea of self-determina-
tion by the patient in that it gives the medical profession sweeping
authority to decide unilaterally what is in the patient's best inter-
est. At best, this view affords the patient only a limited knowledge
of the risks attendant with his treatment-at worst, it affords none
at all. Indeed, one commentator has noted that courts have found
that the current standard of practice for physicians in some com-
munities is to keep the patient completely ignorant of the risks to
which he is subject.81 Ironically, Buckner itself substantiates the
commentator's fear, as the plaintiff there alleged that her physi-
cian and the "medical profession [as a whole were] not adequately
relaying. . . warnings to the consuming public."82 The right of the
patient to disclosure then, is invariably subject to the "ebb and
flow" of the judicial and medical attitude regarding what consti-
tutes "reasonable disclosure." While controversy over the right of
disclosure is unavoidable in the context of operations and the
choice of method of treatment, the same cannot be said of disclos-
ure of risks regarding prescription drugs. With regard to operations
and method of treatment, there is no third party who is qualified
to make disclosure. Only the physician is qualified to make disclos-
ure. But in the case of prescription drugs, both the physician and a
77. 400 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
78. Id. at 823 (quoting Terhune v. A.H. Robbins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978 (Wash. 1978)).
79. Id. at 824. The willingness of the court to adopt this view was, no doubt, influenced
by FLA. STAT. chs. 458, 465, and 500 (1979), which evidence "legislated public policy to rely
on physicians... to protect the consuming public from injury by product use when the
product is a prescription drug." Id. at 822 n.3.
80. For cases consistent with this approach see, e.g., Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075 (6th
Cir. 1981); Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975); Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88
(Ark. 1980); Wagner v. Olmedo, 365 A.2d 643 (Del. 1976); Ross v. Hodges, 234 So. 2d 905
(Miss. 1970).
81. See 1 M. DixoN, supra note 56, § 7.23, at 7-110.
82. Buckner, 400 So. 2d at 821.
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third party, the drug manufacturer, are qualified to make disclos-
ure. The imposition of a manufacturer's duty to inform the patient
would assure the patient the opportunity to be informed and
would not needlessly subject the patient's right of disclosure to the
physician's or the courts' discretion. s
Not all of the problems of informed consent would be eliminated
by a manufacturer-to-patient duty to warn. Since the patient re-
ceives the medication after the physician has already examined
him, the physician must necessarily be responsible for some discus-
sion of the attendant risks at the time the prescription is made.
But self-determination is only meaningful if based upon full dis-
closure. Imposition of the proposed duty would insure that the
right to full disclosure is honored. The fact that the actual right of
self-determination is not exercised until after the prescription is
filled should not diminish the importance of its exercise.
83. The FDA has consistently recognized the role of informed consent in promulgating
certain manufacturer-to-patient warning requirments. See supra note 38. For example, in
response to the mandated patient package insert for the "morning after" pill and Depro-
Provera (injectable contraceptive), Dr. Alexander M. Schmidt, the Commissioner of The
FDA in 1973, noted-
The consumer... would seem to have a right to know the options available
and to participate on an informal basis with her physician in the decision making.
The prerequisite for an informed consent is obviously an informed patient, and
that is the purpose of the patient package insert.
Similar decisions for other classes of drug therapy must also be considered. For
example, some drugs are administered over long periods for chronic diseases.
These drugs may sometimes make the patient more vulnerable to other medical
problems. Here again, the patient has an absolute need, not to say right, to know
what these problems might be and if, in fact, he's willing to accept the risk.
I M. DIxoN, supra note 55, § 6.10[4], at 6-35. Likewise, the Commissioner of the FDA in
1978, Donald Kennedy, commenting on the newly mandated patient labeling for oral contra-
ceptives, noted:
[T]he action represents response to a growing consumer demand for greater
knowledge and a greater voice in making personal choices about contraception.
[T]oday's sophisticated consumers are clearly determined to participate in basic
decisions affecting their personal health and safety. I applaud this trend. I believe
that labeling for patients will make people better patients, better consumers, and
better able to take care of themselves.
Beyond this, I believe that consumers have the right to know what chemicals
they are taking into their bodies. They are today exercising the right as never
before.
In line with this trend, the FDA is committed to doing what it can to provide
consumer information not only about birth control pills but about other prescrip-
tion drugs as well. We want more patients to have more information in plain lan-
guage about their own therapy.
2 M. DixoN. DRUG PRoDucT LrA~anrry § 9.02[2], at 9-14.10 (1982).
150 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:135
C. The Benefits Derived from an Informed Patientry
Beyond allowing the patient to exercise her right to self-determi-
nation, a direct manufacturer-to-patient warning requirement will
serve other useful functions. The benefit derived from having an
informed patient is the most important example. A patient who is
fully informed of the adverse risks attending a particular drug and
the symptoms of an adverse reaction will be better able to recog-
nize those reactions before they fully develop. Moreover, the pa-
tient is more likely to be the first observer of the symptoms of ad-
verse drug reaction. Rarely will the physician be present when
these initial symptoms are manifested. Unless the patient is edu-
cated to watch for danger signals, she will not know the signifi-
cance of these early warnings of adverse reaction. As one commen-
tator aptly stated:
The average patient does not see a physician when the early
danger signs appear, because the significance of the danger is not
recognized.... In many clinical circumstances, the patient con-
tinues ... taking the drug until serious problems develop which
provide the incentive to return to a physician.... The time de-
lay [between recognition of an adverse drug reaction by an in-
formed and an uninformed patient] may spell the difference be-
tween safety and catastrophe.8
Similarly, increased compliance with the proper use of prescrip-
tion drug products should result from direct manufacturer-to-pa-
tient warnings. Current estimated rates of noncompliance range
from fifty to eighty percent for some drug regimens, and thirty to
fifty percent for a wide range of drugs.85 Such evidence has
prompted the FDA to note that "[t]he patient's failure to use a
prescription drug product properly may be a major cause for the
therapeutic failure of the product, or may cause the patient to ex-
perience a serious adverse reaction."86 A direct manufacturer-to-
patient warning should explain both the importance of taking the
drug product as directed and the risks of taking the drug improp-
erly, and thereby aid in reducing the current level of misuse.
Moreover, the informing of the patient by the physician, while
84. See 2 M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LiAnrry, § 9.02[2], at 9-14.12 (emphasia in
original).
85. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,021 (1979).
86. Id.
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such activity is to be encouraged,87 would not necessarily lead to
the same benefits. For instance, a warning from the manufacturer
would necessarily be in writing. A written warning has the advan-
tage of providing a source of future reference to the patient and
almost invariably of providing greater detail than a warning from a
physician. Likewise, studies demonstrate that significant propor-
tions of patients do not remember medical information that is
presented orally,88 and that health professionals frequently use
language that patients do not understand. 9 Finally, numerous
studies have verified that written product information does im-
prove patient knowledge.90
In addition to these benefits, studies have shown wide-spread
public support for the idea of patient labeling accompanying pre-
scription drugs.91 One study featured a nationwide survey of adults
who were asked whether they believed it was important for printed
patient labeling to be provided with prescription drug products.
Sixty-four percent responded positively, while thirty-three percent
believed current practices to be adequate. This two-to-one prefer-
ence for patient labeling was consistent among all sex, age, and
educational subgroups.9 2
Opposition to the idea of a manufacturer-to-patient duty to
warn has emanated almost exclusively from the pharmaceutical
and medical industries.93 The duty, and the methods advocated to
implement it, have been attacked as encouraging self-diagnosis and
the transfer of prescription drugs between patients, producing ad-
verse reactions through suggestion, adversely affecting the liability
of the drug manufacturer, interfering with the patient-physician
87. This article does not propose that a manufacturer-to-patient warning be the sole
source of information for patients about prescription drugs. Ideally, a patient warning will
merely reemphasize and supplement the information provided by the physician when the
drug was prescribed.
88. Ellis, Hopkin, Leitch, & Crofton, "Doctors' orders': controlled trial of supplemen-
tary, written information for patients, I BRr. MED. J. 456 (1979) [hereinafter cited as El-
lis]; Ley & Morris, supra note 70, at 120 table 2, Recall of Orally Presented Medical Infor-
mation (fifteen studies reporting a mean percentage forgotten ranging from 37% to 71%).
89. See Korsch & Negrete, Doctor-Patient Communication, Sci AB. Aug. 1972, at 66.
90. See Ley & Morris, supra note 70, at 125 table 6, Studies Assessing the Effects of
Written Information in Patient Populations (31 of 32 studies finding improvement in pa-
tient knowledge); Ellis, supra note 88.
91. See Ley & Morris, supra note 70, at 123 table 4, Percent Desiring Written Informa-
tion in the Form of Patient Package Inserts (twelve studies reporting findings ranging from
38% to 97%).
92. Roper Reports 78-3:1 (1978), cited in 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,021 (1979).
93. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,022-24 (1979) (presenting a series of arguments
against patient labeling and FDA response thereto).
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relationship, and as carrying a heavy economic impact. The first
two arguments have been rejected by the FDA and others as un-
supported and contrary to available evidence. 4 Manufacturers
might reduce the likelihood of transfer of prescriptions among pa-
tients by advising consumers that the drug has been prescribed for
the particular individual and should not be given to others.,5
Rather than interfering with the patient-physician relationship,
such a warning is likely to foster the relationship. By allowing the
patient to obtain a greater knowledge of the drug product, he is in
a better position to intelligently discuss his treatment with the
physician. Moreover, to the extent that the manufacturer's warn-
ings to the consumer can track the substance of the warnings pro-
vided to the medical. community, similar conclusions regarding the
adequacy of the warning and culpability of the manufacturer will
follow. To the extent that such warnings increase the price of the
drug product, consumers have shown a willingness to incur such
expense in exchange for drug information.9
A final consideration is whether a patient who receives informa-
tion regarding the risks of drug therapy will be charged with
knowledge of the information and, therefore, be deemed to have
assumed the risk of adverse reactions. An FDA attorney has pos-
ited that a patient package insert would provide a minimum level
of information to a patient and that side effects not covered by the
insert would still leave the manufacturer subject to liability.97 The
attorney also contends that a patient package insert would not ab-
solve a drug manufacturer from the effects of overpromoting a
drug or failing to warn the physician. To argue otherwise, this at-
torney notes, "confuses the patient's right to participate in the de-
cision to assent to drug therapy with the [prescribing physician's]
responsibility for choosing the proper drug for his condition."98
The attorney argues that a physician's responsibility depends upon
adequate information from the manufacturer, and "the benefit
94. Id. at 40,022-23; Ley & Morris, supra note 70, at 122.
95. Such statements are currently contained in estrogen and oral contraceptive patient
labeling. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.515(b)(8), 310.501(a)(3)(xvii) (1984).
96. A survey of certain television viewers found that 69% of the noon and 57% of the
evening viewers said they were willing to pay an additional thirty cents per prescription to
receive patient package inserts. Of those not willing to pay thirty cents, 69% of the noon
and 64% of the evening viewers were willing to pay an additional ten cents. 45 Fed. Reg.
60,754, 60,759 (1980).
97. Gardner, Increasing Patient Awareness in Drug Therapy; Ramifications of a Pa-
tient Package Insert Requirement, 66 GEo. L. J. 837, 857-60 (1978).
98. Id. at 859-60.
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given the patient through such increased knowledge should not be
rendered a burden by having it used to reduce manufacturer liabil-
ity." 9 However, where the warning advises of the same risk which
the patient subsequently develops, a patient package insert may
reduce potential manufacturer liability.
IV. METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE MANUFACTURER-TO-PATIENT
DUTY TO WARN
Of the current methods of warning utilized by drug manufactur-
ers, the method with the greatest potential for providing a warning
to the patient is the drug package insert. The drug package insert
is a brochure which contains a summary of a particular drug's indi-
cations and adverse reactions. It is included with the drug package
or container when shipped to the pharmacist. FDA regulations
make the inserts mandatory for every package of a drug which
reaches the pharmacist's shelf.100 The purpose of the insert is to
provide current information on the product to the physician. Theo-
retically, the insert is available to the prescribing physician,
though there are no provisions for forwarding such inserts to him.
Not surprisingly, the inserts are rarely requested- by the physician
and are removed and discarded by the pharmacist before the drug
is sold to the consumer. FDA regulations are silent on the removal
of these package inserts.10 1 Thus, the current practice makes the
package insert of minimal value as a tool for transmitting product
deficiencies to physicians.
With only a few modifications to the existing drug package in-
sert program, however, warnings about a vast array of prescription
medicines can be provided to the consumer.102 For drugs which are
sent by the manufacturer in prepackaged containers not meant to
be subdivided by the pharmacist, the warning may be communi-
cated to the consumer by simply prohibiting the removal of the
enclosed drug package insert. For drug products which are distrib-
uted in mass quantity containers which the pharmacist subse-
quently repackages based upon the patient's prescribed dosage, the
warning can be provided to the consumer by sending a sufficient
quantity of package inserts to the pharmacist to cover the contem-
99. Id. at 860.
100. 1 M. Dixon, supra note 56, § 6.10[4][a], at 6-33.
101. Id.
102. Under the FDA approach, the drug manufacturer must provide both patient pack-
age inserts and physician package inserts.
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plated breakdown of the product shipment. Then, the pharmacist
could include a package insert with each prescription filled.
Of course, for the package insert to be truly helpful to the pa-
tient, its content must be understandable. Much of what is cur-
rently contained in the package insert would need to be "rewrit-
ten" in language understandable to the lay consumer. Medical
terminology within the insert regarding adverse reactions would
need to be replaced with simpler language.
The FDA currently employs a similar approach in requiring "pa-
tient leaflets and brochures" for oral and injectable contraceptives,
the morning-after pill, aerosolized asthma drugs, and the intrauter-
ine device (IUD).10 3 In 1979, the FDA proposed to establish a com-
prehensive patient package insert program which would have ex-
tended to most prescription drug products.104 The following year
the FDA adopted a rule establishing an initial implementation pe-
riod of three years for ten specified drug classes.105 The agency
based its action on the benefits consumers would receive from writ-
ten information concerning prescription drugs.106 Under the regu-
lation, patient package inserts (PPIs) written in nontechnical lan-
guage and adapted from the existing professional labeling for the
product would have been required to accompany new prescriptions
of drugs from the specified drug classes. The PPI was to include a
summary section on information about the drug, and more detailed
sections which were to describe the proper uses of the drug, cir-
cumstances under which it should not be used, serious adverse re-
actions, precautions to be observed when using the drug, risks of
developing tolerance to or dependence on the drug, proper re-
sponses by patients in case of overdosage, and the possible side
effects from the use of the drug.1 07
Prior to the effective date of the regulation, however, a tempo-
rary stay was issued by the FDA. 08 The temporary stay was fol-
103. See supra note 38.
104. 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016 (1979).
105. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754 (1980). The 10 drug classes included were: ampicillins,
benzodiazepines, cometidine, clodibrate, digoxin, methoxsalen, propoxyphene, phinytion,
thiszides, and warfarin. Id. at 60,758.
106. For a thorough discussion of the patient package insert proposal, see Joint Sympo-
sium on Drug Information for Patients-Patient Package Insert, 11 DRuG INFo. J. (Supp.
1977); see also 44 Fed. Reg. 40,016, 40,022 (1979) (77 articles listed in reference nos. 122-
199). Generally, individual consumers and consumer groups favored patient package inserts,
while individual physicians, pharmacists, and pharmaceutical manufacturers opposed them.
45 Fed. Reg. 60,754, at 60,756 (1980).
107. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754, 60,781-82 (1980).
108. 46 Fed. Reg. 23,739 (1981).
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lowed by revocation of the patient package insert program in
1982.109 The stay and revocation are easily traceable to a change in
political orientation of the executive branch after President Rea-
gan took office in 1981. The temporary stay of the regulation was
largely responsive to Executive Order 12,291110 concerning the
Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief. Section 7 of the Or-
der provided that "agencies shall. . . suspend or postpone the ef-
fective dates of all major rules that they have promulgated in final
form as of the date of this Order, but that have not yet become
effective. . . ."'ll The revocation, in turn, followed the appoint-
ment of a new FDA Commissioner "12 and the repudiation of many
of the principles accepted by the FDA in the preceding years." "
The new FDA position is that private sector initiatives should
prove at least as efficient as the FDA-mandated patient warn-
ings.1  Without debating the soundness of such an assumption,"6
it is important to note that the FDA still believes that "patients
have both a right and a need to know about the drugs they use."'1
Thus, while the FDA has receded from its position of mandating
patient package inserts, it has not receded from its position as to
the desirability of an informed patient. Rather, the FDA has cho-
sen to rely upon voluntary drug information programs in the pri-
vate sector. The FDA noted that several comments to the revoca-
tion of the PPI program "stated that most voluntary drug
information programs have arisen only as a direct result of FDA
pressure and argued that if the agency revokes the PPI program,
the promise of voluntary alternative programs will fade and the
programs will never materialize."" 7 Indeed, such voluntary pro-
grams are as yet largely unfelt by the majority of drug consumers.
Courts, however, could ensure the continued development of the
"voluntary warning initiative" by imposing upon the drug manu-
109. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (1982).
110. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
111. Id. at 13,196.
112. Arthur Hull Hayes, Jr. replaced Jere E. Gowan in the interim between publication
of the final rule in 45 Fed. Reg. 60,754 (1980) and temporary stay of the rule in 46 Fed. Reg.
13,193 (1981).
113. Compare, e.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 60,760-61 comments 5, 7 (1980) with 47 Fed. Reg.
39,148 comment 2 (1982).
114. 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147 (1982). Examples of such private initiatives are discussed id. at
39,151.
115. For consumer criticism of such an assumption, see 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,148 gen-
eral comments (1982).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 39,152.
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facturer a duty to warn the patient. In imposing such a duty, the
courts can be secure in the knowledge that there are realistic,
available methods of warning, and that private industry has al-
ready represented its ability to implement such warnings.
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to the introductory hypothetical, the only person hav-
ing any liability under the current state of the law is the physician.
The physician's liability is contingent upon a showing of causa-
tion-that "but for" his failure to warn the patient, the patient
would not have taken the drug. The manufacturer has no duty to
warn the patient of the possible adverse effects.
While the prescribing physician is undoubtedly in the best posi-
tion to determine whether a patient is an appropriate candidate
for a particular drug, the manufacturer is more knowledgeable
about the adverse effects and risks of the drug. After all, it is the
drug manufacturer who has rigorously tested the drug for such ad-
verse effects before gaining FDA approval to market the drug.
Given that the product warning regarding contra-indications is de-
rived from this extensive testing, which, undoubtedly, is meant to
inure to the benefit of the patient, the law ought to see that the
patient is actually warned. As such, a mandatory duty to inform
the consumer of the risk of a drug should be imposed upon the
manufacturer, as is the general rule with respect to manufacturers
of other products, in lieu of the current discretionary duty by the
medical profession.
In order for a product warning to be effective, the following cri-
teria must be met:
(1) the warning must be received;
(2) the warning must be understood; and
(3) the individual must act in accordance with the warning.118
Leaving the disclosure of warnings to the medical profession fre-
quently results in no warning being received by the patient. Infor-
mation not received by the patient, of course, cannot be under-
stood. A direct manufacturer-to-patient duty to warn in lay
language would ensure receipt of a warning understandable to the
consumer.
The only remaining impediment to an effective system of warn-
ings is the extent to which the patient makes use of the warnings.
118. Adapted from Dorris & Purswell, Warnings and Human Behavior: Implications for
the Design of Product Warnings, 1 J. PROD. LWE. 255, 256 (1977).
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Thus, the final utility of the warning information is subject to the
patient's self-determination. The patient can familiarize himself
with the risks, accept them, and attempt to watch for the early
symptoms of an adverse reaction. The patient may reject the risks
and decide not to use the drug. Alternatively, the patient may neg-
lect to familiarize himself with the warning (perhaps, thereby, as-
senting to the treatment). The ultimate choice is left to the pa-
tient. This is as it should be.
In the future, courts should not so readily adopt the rationale of
the "learned intermediary," but instead examine closely its under-
lying premise, taking into account the developments in the con-
sumer movement, the substantial benefits derived from informed
patients, and the existence of reasonable methods for the pharma-
ceutical industry to comply with the imposition of a duty to warn
the consumer.

